The literature of private provision of public goods suggests that incentive to contribute is inversely related to group size. This paper empirically tests this relationship using field data from Chinese Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia. We exploit an exogenous reduction in group size as a result of the blocking of Wikipedia in mainland China and examine whether individual contributions increase after the block as predicted in the literature. Our result indicates the opposite: individual contribution of unaffected contributors decreases by 42% on average as a result of the block. We attribute the cause to social effects: contributors care about the number of beneficiaries of their contributions. We build a simple model to illustrate how social effects and group size affect individual incentive to contribute. Consistent with our model prediction, we find that the more a contributor values social recognition, the greater the reduction in her contributions after the block. A series of robustness checks appear to support our explanation.
Introduction
A fundamental question in the private provision of public good concerns the relationship between group size and incentive to contribute. The major focus of the literature has been the "crowding out" hypothesis: when the population grows, individual contribution level will decline (e.g., Olson 1965; Andreoni 1988) . The intuition is that individuals treat others' contributions as substitutes to their own. Consequently, as group size increases, they are more likely to free ride.
We empirically examine the causal effect of changes in group size on individual contributions. Identification hinges on an exogenous reduction in group size at Chinese Wikipedia, the Chinese language version of an online encyclopedia that relies entirely on voluntary contribution. Contributors to Chinese Wikipedia are composed of Chinese-speaking people in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other regions in the world. We exploit the block to Chinese Wikipedia in mainland China in October 2005. As a result of the block, while contributors from other parts of the world were not affected, mainland Chinese could not use or contribute to Chinese Wikipedia.
We empirically test whether the reduction in group size leads to increases in individual contributions as predicted in the literature. Our results indicate the opposite: individual contributions of unaffected contributors decrease by 42% on average as a result of the block.
We attribute the cause to social effects: contributors care about the number of beneficiaries of their contributions. The shrinking group size weakened these social effects. As a result, even though the incentive to free ride decreased after the block, when social effects are important, individual contributions could decrease. We build a simple framework to illustrate how social effects and group size affect individual incentive to contribute. Consistent with our model prediction, we find that the more a contributor values social recognition, the greater the reduction in her contribution after the block.
Our study contributes to the theoretical literature on private provision of public goods.
The literature starts with Olson (1965) 's conjecture that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups as individuals have incentive to free ride other people's contributions. Andreoni (1988) and Fries et al. (1991) examine the conjecture in the context of continuous public goods where individual utility depends on private good consumption and total private provision of the public good. They show that as group size increases to infinity, individual contribution level falls to zero. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Hindriks and Pancs (2002) analyze discrete public goods 1 and find the same result. As Andreoni (1988) points out, these results fail to confirm empirical observations about charity and have limited predictive power. Therefore, it is necessary to generalize these models to include other motives for giving.
Our model is the first to incorporate group size into individuals' utility. In our model, for a given contribution, the larger the group, the more utility (e.g., social recognition) the contributor derives. The idea that contributors receive social recognition, or they experience a "warm glow" from contributing has been suggested numerous times in the literature (e.g., Becker 1974; Rege 2004; Rege and Telle 2004; Carman 2006) . A number of recent studies on open source communities also find that contributors indeed derive utility from helping others and gaining respect (e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2002; Lakhani and von Hippel 2003) .
Surprisingly, theoretical studies related to group size have not considered these social effects.
Even in models that explicitly incorporate warm-glow motives, warm glow is often assumed to be independent of group size (e.g., Ribar and Wilhelm 2002) . We show that incorporat-ing group size could overturn the inverse relationship between group size and incentive to contribute found in prior theoretical models.
Our research also contributes to the empirical literature that examines the group size effects. The majority of the existing literature is based on experimental data. In general, these experiments find increased free-riding behavior in larger groups (e.g., Sweeney 1973;
Chamberlin 1978), although some of the studies suggest that group size effects could be weak (e.g., Marwell and Ames 1979; Chamberlin 1978) . One exception is Isaac et al. (1994) , which finds that groups of 40 and 100 subjects provide the good more efficiently than groups of 4 and 10. In their study, however, the public good is divided among participants. As a result, an increase in group size reduces the benefit of the public good to each participant.
Laboratory studies on this topic are necessarily handicapped because in comparison with the group sizes we often find in real world, groups used in the experiments are of very small sizes.
A couple of studies have used field data to test the group size effects. Goetze et al. (1993) examine contributions to public television stations and find that average contributions per contributor decrease with group size. Brunner (1998) studies contributions to public radio stations and finds that the proportion of listeners contributing to public radio decreases as the number of listeners increases. In addition, he finds that as group size increases, average contributions per contributor remain constant. Our empirical study differs from these studies in two aspects. First, we measure changes in contributions at the individual level, while the two studies use aggregate data. Second, we exploit an exogenous change of group size to establish the causal relationship between group size and incentive to contribute. As many factors could change group size and incentive to contribute at the same time, the relationships found in prior studies could be spurious.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 presents the empirical results and various robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
Assume there are n people in the economy who benefit from the provision of a public good.
Each person can choose whether to contribute to the public good. If she contributes, she incurs a fixed cost, c. If not, she could free ride the public good. The n people differ in their willingness to contribute, which is denoted by θ. Assume that for each person i, her type θ i is independently and identically drawn from a probability distribution function F (θ)
with the corresponding density function f (θ). Assume the person with type θ * is indifferent between contributing and not contributing. That is, any one with θ ≥ θ * will contribute.
The number of contributors in the economy is n[1 − F (θ * )].
Baseline Case
More contributors lead to better quality and hence greater utility from using the public good.
Let the utility from the public good be U n[1 − F (θ * )] , where U (•) is an increasing and concave function, and U (0) = 0. Denote the warm-glow motive by w (Andreoni 1989). Let
be the fraction of population that contributes to the public good.
Specifically, k * is implicitly defined by
To be consistent with the literature, we define warm glow as the pure joy of contributing to a good cause to distinguish it from social effects. Therefore, warm glow here does not depend on the number of potential beneficiaries and the number of contributors. We assume w < c so that not everyone contributes.
It is straightforward to show, from (1), that warm glow can partially alleviate the freeriding problem.
Proposition 1. If there exists warm-glow motive, a higher percentage of population contributes to the public good.
Proof. Let the proportion of contributors bek, andk satisfies U (nk) = c. Since U is a concave function, U (nk * ) = c − w < c = U (nk), we have k * >k.
When someone makes a contribution, the quality of the public good increases. In addition, she could enjoy more utility from the product than from free-riding. U (nk * ) captures this additional utility. Therefore, the left hand side of (1) measures the marginal benefit from contributing to the public good. The right hand side is the marginal cost of contributing.
We can derive the familiar free-riding result as below.
Proposition 2. The fraction of people free-riding increases with the group size.
Proof. Since U (•) is well-behaved, we can write
where
When n goes to infinity, the proportion of contributors goes to zero:
Proposition 2 indicates that when the population size increases, the proportion of contributors declines. In terms of θ * , this result suggests that when the group size is very large, only those with very high willingness-to-contribute will contribute.
Note that the result in Proposition 2 holds regardless of the inclusion of the warm-glow motive. This observation suggests that warm-glow motive cannot be an explanation of the provision of public goods in very large groups.
Social Effects
We now extend the baseline model to incorporate social effects. When a person contributes to the public good, she may enjoy additional utility when she knows that her contribution is valued by others even if there is no direct communication with the potential beneficiaries.
Letk be the fraction of population that contributes in this case.
2 Denote the utility derived from social effects by V (n,k) for all contributors. V (0, •) = 0. We assume
and
> 0, so that the utility of social value increases with both the population and the number of contributors. Note that V (n,k) is a function of both n andk. If the contributors only value social interaction with other contributors, then V (n,k) = V (nk). By choosing this more general form, we are able to consider more flexible interpretations of social effects.
Similar to (1), the marginal contributor has
Equation (3) suggests that for the marginal contributor, the cost of contributing equals the total utility from warm glow, additional benefit from the improved public good, and social benefits. Comparing (3) with (1) gives the following result.
Proposition 3. For any given group size, the proportion of population that contributes is higher when contributors receive additional utility from social interactions.
Proof. From equations (1) and (3), we have
As U (•) is concave, nk > nk * , and hencek > k * .
We now examine howk changes with n with the inclusion of social effects. Let B ≡ w + U (nk) + V (n,k) be the marginal benefit from contributing.
As U (nk) < 0 and
can be positive or negative. An increase in group size now has two effects. On one hand, it induces more people to free ride as now the marginal benefit from the improved public good becomes smaller. On the other hand, as more people are contributing, the benefit from social effects increases. Hence, the net effect of group size on the total marginal benefit from contributing depends on the relative strength of each effect.
> −kU (nk) , the increase in the utility from social value is greater than the decrease in utility from the public good as n increases, so that the overall benefit from contributing increases. As the marginal cost does not change, the indifferent person will prefer contributing to the public good when n increases. Hence, a larger proportion of population will contribute when n increases.
∂V (n,k) ∂n < −kU (nk) , the utility from social effects is small so that as n increases, the indifferent person will prefer free-riding. Hence, a smaller proportion of population will contribute in this case.
Proposition 4. When contributors value social interactions, as group size increases, the percentage of population that contributes increases if
, and decreases if
The result suggests a tension between the incentive to free ride and the desire to enjoy increased social benefits when the group size increases. We find that when the increase in the social benefits is relatively small, individual contribution will decrease as the group size increases. When such increase is large, individual contributions may increase. and lasted for nearly one year. Figure 1 shows the number of new contributors in Chinese Wikipedia over time. We find that before this block, the number of contributors grew exponentially over time. The number dropped significantly as a result of the block. Shortly after the block, the number continued to grow at an even faster rate, most likely due to the great deal of publicity Chinese Wikipedia received as a result of the block. We choose to focus on the third block as it is the longest block among the five blocks. In the other four instances, blocking and unblocking often happened within several days and their impact is limited. In addition, as we are interested in individual-level contribution, a short time period does not allow us to accurately measure the changes in contribution. Finally, the third block was widely publicized. In response to this block, the home page of Chinese 
Data
We obtain our data set from the Chinese Wikipedia Web site (http://zh.wikipedia.org/). 
Analysis
We first identify the contributors who are unaffected by the block. Wikipedia does not reveal geographic information about individual contributors. As a result, we rely on the contribution history of each contributor to infer whether she was affected. Figure 2 shows the weekly total contribution measured by the total number of characters added and deleted for unaffected contributors over time. We find that for both measures the level of contribution drops after the block. The drop is more significant for the number of characters added.
We now test the change in contributions in a regression framework for each individual contributor. We employ the following specification:
The dependent variable, Contributions, is the weekly contributions of each unaffected contributor to Wikipedia articles.
We use logarithms of the number of characters added and deleted as measures for individual contributions. 7 We consider addition and deletion as different forms of editing as the amount of effort involved may be different. Af terBlock is a dummy which equals 1 if the time period is after the block and 0 otherwise. We also include age, which is measured as the number of weeks since the contributor joins Wikipedia, as a control variable, and the square of age to control for possible curvilinear effects. We repeat the analysis controlling for individual fixed effects in Models 4, 5 and 6. All results suggest the same pattern: while contribution in general decreases at a decreasing rate with age, the block has significantly reduced incentive to contribute. In addition, the 7 We add 1 to these measures before taking logarithms as some numbers can be zero.
number of characters added drops more than the number of characters deleted. A backof-the-envelope calculation based on Model 3 suggests that weekly individual contribution dropped by approximately 42% as a result of the block (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980; Kennedy 1981 ).
We then turn to examine the impact of social effects. We measure the amount of social interactions each unaffected contributor had had before the block using data on her participation in user pages and user-talk pages on Wikipedia. Active participation in these pages suggests that these contributors are more likely to desire a high level social recognition.
Therefore, if social effects provide important motivation for contribution, we expect these socially active contributors to be affected more by the block. We consider the following differences-in-differences specification:
where SociallyActive is the logarithm of the sum of total addition and total deletion in user pages or user-talk pages by each contributor before the block.
We report the results in Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2 . The significant positive coefficients of SociallyActive indicate that in general, contributors deriving more social utility contribute more. The negative coefficients of the interaction variable suggest that these contributors are affected significantly more by the block.
To ensure that the results are not driven by outliers, in Models 5, 6 and 7, we exclude contributors whose weekly contribution exceeds four standard deviations from the mean.
Forty five contributors are excluded and we obtain similar results.
Robustness Checks 3.4.1 Seasonality
A natural concern is whether the results above are a consequence of time-specific effects. It could be that contributors contribute less in November than in September and early October in any year. We therefore replicate the analysis in Table 1 , and the first three models in Table 2 , for the same time period in years 2003 and 2004, and report the results in Table 3 .
We find that while socially active contributors contribute more during these periods, we detect no significant difference in contribution before October 19 and after October 31 in 2003 and 2004.
Controversial Articles
We are also concerned that the decrease in contribution may result from less disagreement in editing after the block. Contributors in mainland China may hold different political views from those in other regions such as Taiwan.
8 After the block, we would expect to see less disagreement in editing Wikipedia articles and hence less editing. We conduct two tests. First, we focus our analysis on new articles. If the decrease is caused entirely by less disagreement rather than social factors, we would expect no decline in the level of effort in creating new articles. 9 We count the number of characters in each new article and use the logarithm of weekly contribution in new articles by each contributor as the dependent variable. Table 4 reports the result. We find that after the block contributors create fewer new articles, and the decrease is mostly associated with socially active contributors.
In the second test, we examine category information for each article. When editing articles, a contributor can map these articles to a list of categories in the database. New categories can also be easily created. For example, an article about "auction theory" would be mapped to "applied mathematics," "economics and finance," and "game theory." We compile a list of 31,871 categories from all articles, and manually go through the list. 10 In the end, we identify 2,500 categories as contentious categories. We then exclude contributions to articles in these categories and repeat the analysis. Table 5 reports the results. The results are similar.
Fewer New Articles for Revision
Our third concern is that the decrease is caused by fewer new articles created. As fewer new articles are created after the block, contributors may have less content to improve.
We recompute individual contribution, this time only including the contribution to articles created before the time window (i.e., four weeks before October 19, 2005) . We repeat the analysis and obtain similar results (Table 6 ).
Proxy Server
Finally, technically-adept contributors in mainland China might use proxy servers to circumvent the block. As proxy servers are slow, they might contribute less than before. Our classification scheme would classify them as unaffected contributors. As a result, we may observe a decrease in contribution. This concern is alleviated by a Wikipedia policy 11 that prevents contributors from editing using open and anonymous proxies. In addition, the (Table 7) .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we utilize an exogenous shock on the group size of Wikipedia participants to study how incentive to contribute reacts to a change in group size. In contrast to prior studies, we find that when the group size is exogenously reduced, contribution from the remaining population reduced by approximately 42%.
To explain this phenomenon, we provide a simple theoretical framework to demonstrate that the observation may be attributed to social effects. In various empirical specifications, we consistently find that socially more active contributors react to the exogenous shock more strongly than those who are less active.
Our results suggest that when people contribute to public goods, they care about not only the consequence of their contributions (provision/quality of the good), but also about the social recognition of their contributions. Awareness of the impact of social effects may help governments, non-profit organizations, and other public goods providers to introduce this important dimension into their planning and campaigns.
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